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Canadian Foreign Aid Objectives: Perceptions of Policy Makers*
Joseph K. Ingram
This paper will analyze the importance accorded to humanitarian,
economic and political motivations by those actively involved in Canadian
aid policy formulation and administration. It will test empirically certain
widely held assumptions, for example, that foreign aid is basically a
humanitarian inspired process whose intended and resulting effects are
perceived as primarily of benefit to the recipient. The paper will in
fact present evidence which suggests that aid perceptions form an integral
part of Canadian foreign policy and are conceived with the benefits to
the donor as foremost in mind, often to the detriment of the recipient.
At the same time the paper will establish additional hypothesis concerning
the objectives of Canadian foreign aid and nature of the perceptual frame-
work within which they are conceived.
Data for this paper consists for the most part of the results of a
series of 13 personal interviews of senior government policy-makers actively
involved in both the formulation and administration of foreign aid programs.
The interviews were conducted in February 1969. The officials represented
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Departments of
Finance, Industry Trade and Commerce, External Affairs, and also included
* The author is presently employed in the Population and Health Sciences
Division of the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa. The
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Centre.
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the Minister of External Affairs and the Chairman of the Parliamentary
External Affairs Committee. By including the latter two officials, it
was hoped to incorporate into the data some reflection of the interplay
in the policy process existing between the
II and the
IIpolitician" . Members of these various departments (including two
from the Bank of Canada) comprise the International Development Board
(IDB), the small, senior governmental committee which theoretically
coordinates and formulates policies from among the various ministries
concerned with foreign aid. Professor Keith Spicer in discussing the
activities of this Board, noted that, ".. in practice this includes
receiving all major submissions to cabinet, on bilateral aid, country
allocations, propositions of each aid type, and capital projects." 1*
The primary data has been developed and analyzed against a fairly
complete examination of existing secondary source material. These have
consisted for the most part of statements taken from speeches, scholarly
journalism, administrative policy guidelines and reports, and various
kinds of agency memoranda. The general tenor of these sources varies
from the moderately critical journalism of some of the operational aspects
of Canada's aid programs 2. published by academics and those interested
Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State: External Aid in Canada's Foreign
Policy, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1966) pp. 108-109.
Professor Spicer's work constitutes one of the few attempts to
deal extensively with Canadian foreign aid. Though analytical
it remains nonetheless descriptive in nature.




in the aid process and international development, to the justifications
for Canadian aid objectives which are published by the
Canadian govern-
ment in particular.
The interview technique was employed as this paper's primary source
of data as it was felt that through it one can best identify
the basic
conceptual premises within which Canadian aid policy-makers operate.
Such
an approach enables one to determine if in fact
Canadian aid policy and
programmes are conceived within a conceptual framework
based upon the kind
of recipient beneficial concerns which Canada's official aid
policy espouses.
I would contend that policy and programs are to a great extent
reflective
of policy-maker's perceptions, although until more is known about
the
decision-making process in Ottawa this remains largely hypothetical.
An important example of government expression in the area of foreign
aid policy was the 1970 publication of the series of booklets called
Foreign Policy for Canadians. The booklet entitled International
Development
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set forth, what nominally at least, constituted the objectives
of Canadian
development assistance and the justifications for such policy.
"The
government regards the economic and social development of the delreloping
This would include the Annual -DAC Review on Development Assistance,
publicly accepted among the donors as the organization whose recommendations
are to serve as the standards to which donors should aspire.
The
DAC is composed only of aid donors.
"International Development", Foreign Policy for Canadians, Secretary
of State for External Affairs, Queens Printer, Ottawa, 1970.
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countries as the primary objective of the Canadian development assistance
programme". Such development was to be brought about through efforts to
... support and foster the growth and evolution of the social, educational,
industrial, commercial and administrative systems of the developing
countries in such a way that their people can improve their own organization
and capacity to produce, distribute and consume goods and services, and
thereby improve the quality of life in their countries".5 Canadian
assistance therefore is expressed officially as having it's principle
objectives embodied in a beneficial impact on the host countries to which
it is given. Expressed as secondary or incidental in nature are the incumbent
benefits of Canadian aid to Canadian trade, the national economy, Canada's
international relations with the Third World, as well as aid's capacity
to reflect the bilingual character of Canada ... which helps contribute
to our sense of internal unity and purpose.n 6Presented in a foreign
policy context, this particular publication perhaps best expresses
Canada's official foreign aid policy, as well as its justification.
Contrary to the policy outlined by the Canadian government
publication International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians, this
paper argues that Canadian aid is perceived and undertaken in a con-
- ceptual framework which is basically self-serving. Such a framework
views the principle objectives of Canadian aid as the creation of a stable,
peaceful, and relatively homogenous world in which the potential for
Canadian economic, commercial and political benefits is enhanced by





beneficial concerns, are not considered significant to the sama degree.
Humanitarian concern as a policy determinant is perceived as of marginal
consequence. Whether these kinds of self-serving perceptions are
reflected in operational terms and programme criteria, remains a subject
of contention and further study. The Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, would
rank Canada highly as a beneficent donor whose relatively easy terms
reflect a sincere concern for the plight of developing countries.7 Host
nations such as India, Tanzania or Algeria however, might simply view
Canada's approach as the least exploitive in what is basically a donor-
8
beneficial game. Whether Canada's aid programs have the desired results
in achieving the objectives expressed by those officials interviewed, again
is a subject of much controversy and would require extensive empirical
study on the effects of aid as a tool of Canadian foreign and economic
policy.
Canadian Perceptions
Canadian officials emphasized two basic objectives to their
foreign aid program. First and foremost, the long range goals of a stable
and relatively homogenous world, and secondly, Canadian commercial interests.
Canadian aid was not viewed in an ideological or evangelical framework
and the interviewers denied that Canadian foreign aid is used as a strategic
" tool " in particular countries of the Third World. Strategic concerns
were elicited in the form of concern with the attainment of a global
long-run stability, and the short-run strategic objectives of alleviating
See Development Cooperation: 1973 Review (OECD Paris, 1973)
Theresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Penguin, New York, 1971)
Joan Robinson, "Economics and the Third World", An address tó the
University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, April 2, 1974.
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the potential for further Quebec discontent by increasing Canadian aid
ties to Francophone Africa.
Aid as a Reflection of Humanitarianism
To begin with, the evidence presented shows that humanitarianism,
as an operating .premise in the formulation of Canadian aid policy is of
minor significance. This is contrary to the justifications often evoked
by both statesmen and even scholars (statesmen more often publicly than
otherwise) who view the humanitarian prerogatives as foremost in the
transfer of resources from Canada to thelless-developed nations1.9 The
rhetoric of humanitarian obligation for the alleviation of suffering
and starvation is very often seen as the cradle in which aid programs
should be developed. It is a motivation which if exercised in fact
would more likely result in programs of a recipient-beneficial impact.
Indeed, this is the motivating premise which the Canadian electorate most
frequently seems to ascribe to Canadian external aid.
10.
See for example Mitchell Sharp, speech to the Chartered Accountants
Group, Toronto, 1966, in International Development (The Information
Department of the External Aid Office, Ottawa, May 1968), page 7,
Paul Martin Speaks for Canada (McClelland-Stewart Ltd., Toronto,
Montreal, 1967) p. 132, Paul Gérin Lajoie, Focus on Man (Canadian
International Development Agency, Ottawa, 1974). Possibly the out-
standing academic proponent of this point of view is Barbara Ward,
The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (W.W. Norton and Co., New
York, 1962) who has described her thesis as moral in that the poor
nations are in part a product of our own making and that-this assumes
an acceptance of moral responsibilities in relation to their economic
and social development.
The concept humanitarianism is significant only insofar as policy-
makers express an awareness of it. To the extent they do however, it
den6tes the expression of a moral duty to give,deriving from the
sentiment of fellow-feeling with others in their suffering. For a more
profound discussion of this concept's relevance, see Joseph Cropsey,
"The Right of Foreign Aid", ed. Robert Coldwin, Why Foreign Aid?,
(Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1962).
To the question, "To what extent do you think that humanitarian
considerations are an important factor in.the objectives of aid?," only
four officials expressed the view that Canadian foreign aid is motivated
primarily by humanitarian considerations. The other nine, perceived it
as relevant only to the extent that it provides the foreign aid program,
with necessary public support and legitimacy. Typical were the following
responses:
"When there is a famine, then it becomes important, almost as a
direct proportion to the number of people starving. So with this emerging
aid, the do-goodness etc. humanitarianism is a factor of consequence."
.... to the general public humanitarian motives are important but
at the government level it's a little more cold-blooded."
This government view of humanitarianism as tantamount to the
naive justification of an 'uneducated' public is further substantiated
by the fact that eight of the officials concurred in the view that he
general public did not understand the purposes of the foreign aid program.
Only one official responded to the contrary. This tends to confirm the
view that humanitarianism, as a motivating factor in the formulation of
Canada's aid program, is relatively insignificant.
Aid as a Commercial Benefit:
One particular view of what motivates Canadian aid contends that
it is primarily the prospect of enhancing Canada's economic and commercial
position through the 'development' of resource-rich though capital-poor
states. This is a view which is primarily rooted in a recipient-beneficial
perception of the aid relationship. Another view however, would argue that
'
this could not be the case as these purported benefits to the Canadian
economic and commercial position just do not exist.11 And yet despite
this controversy (albeit largely academic) the interviewed officials
were virtually unanimous in their perceptions of possible commercial and
economic advantages. For example, in responding to the question, "Do yóu
see aid as a direct stimulus to Canadian exports?", twelve of the
respondents answered positively, though none viewed it as the leading
justification for aid. Several of the CIDA and External Affairs officials
did nonetheless identify these motives as the most important among Trade
and Commerce (IT&C) people. As one of the IT&C officials observed:
"We try to see that aid is used for introducing
products likely to have a continuing demand. Products
with labels versus staples, which would continue
after they reach the takeoff point. After all, we
will provide a product only that we are competitive
-in."
This perception acquires even greater significance in light of
Canadian 'tied aid' conditions. Canada makes available only up to twenty
(20) per cent of total bilateral allocations on a completely untied baSis
for projects and programs, with a further sixty-five (65) per cent available
on a restricted untied basis for procurement in Canada or the less developed
countries (LDC's)designated by the United Nation.
11. The economic-commercial motivation attributed to Canadian aid is one
of the supposed 'myths' which Keith Spicer attempts to invalidate.
See Keith Spicer, op. cit. Chapter I. I would contend however, that
regardless of the validity of Spicer's argument (itself rather tenuous),
policy derives from perceptions of reality, rather than reality itself.
So whether or not Spicer is correct is unimportant. See for example
Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", ed.
James Rosenau, International.Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free
Press, New York, 1961), also K.T. Holsti, op. cit. and Alexander
George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1969.
Canadian officials were then asked if foreign aid affected world
trade. Eleven of those interviewed agreed that it does. As one of them
concluded: "To the extent you are successful in development, then you are
creating world markets". Furthermore, the two officials who denied aid's
contribution to world trade referred specifically to the marginal benefits
of the Canadian aid program - citing it as too small - rather than the
impotence of foreign assistance generally. It is evident therefore that the
potential commercial benefits to Canada constitute an important part of the
perceptual framework in which aid programs are conceived and administered.
Aid as an Economic Benefit:
Similarly, Canadian officials acknowledged a concern for aid's
potential benefits to the Canadian economy with nine of the respondents
identifying aid as an increasingly significant economic stimulus. Although
not invoked as the most important consideration, precise benefits were nonetheless
identified. "If for alleviating unemployment, yes its effects are the
same as any other pump-priming tool it becomes an aspect of the
inflationary process. Besides, between 80-90% is initially spent'in Canada
So this both stimulates the economy and ends up paying its full price
, with the achievement of full employment". Four of the respondents stated that
no economic benefits were forthcoming from foreign aid. Thus, despite the
real advantages which Canada does or does not procure from foreign aid,
officials are cognizant of both the commercial and economic benefits which
Canada can procure from aid.
Aid as a Strategic Tool:
In broadening the dimensions of the perceptual framework within
which Canadian aid officials operate, the interview data provides further
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evidence which suggests that aid is perceived primarily in donor-beneficial
terms. One would logically expect that aid perceptions would place the
greatest concern on the "development"of the recipient as an end in itself
rather than as a means to the promotion of the donor's own national interests.12
This, after all is what foreign aid-development assistance is supposed to
be all about.
Yet in response to the following question, "What do you feel are the
primary objectives of Canadian external aid?" three basic themes emerged.
(See Table I). Unlike the questions dealing with the economic and commercial
dimension which actually suggested benefits, this particular question was
posed prior to the others and was completely open-ended. Because several
of the respondents designated more than one objective in each response, the
significance accorded to each theme is determined according to the number of
times each was cited. For this reason the total in Table I indicates 15
responses.
Two of the identifiable themes, together comprising a total of ten
responses were what could be classified as "strategic", that is denoting
a perception of aid in donor-beneficial terms, or as a means to achieving
a precise end (precise in the mind of the policy-maker) other than
"development"(Os perceived and desired by the recipient.)
12. For a blatant example of where such a realignement of priorities
has occurred see Krassowski's discussion of American aid to
Tunisia, Andrzej Krassowski, The Aid Relationship (The Overseas
Development Institute Ltd., London, 1968) p. 23
TABLE I
WHAT DO YOU FEEL ARE THE PRIMARY-OBJECTIVES OF CANADIAN
EXTERNAL AID?
The theme which emerged most frequently was that of Canadian aid as
a long-term strategic tool. This was expressed on seven occasions in terms
of achieving 'peace', 'stability', and a reso1ution of conflict'. As one
official remarked:
"Basically the long-run political purpose is one of creating
peace and stability in the world, again largely political
and economic. There is some egalitarianism involved no doubt,
in the sense that the gap between the poor and the rich
is terribly wrong".
This long-term objective was further substantiated by responses to the
question "Do you think that the objectives of aid are concerned with the
preservation of world peace?". Nine of the officials concurred with the
view that aid constitutes a deterrent to violence, while at the same time
contributing to peace in the long run. In contrast the four remaining
officials viewed aid as the very cause of violence in the short-run.
The perception of aid as a short-term strategic tool, was expressed
on three occasions. Short-term strategic denotes a means to achieving
Long-term Strategic 7




a short-rlin end conceived in terms of the donor-benefits. The short-
term connotes a response to what is generally viewed as an unforeseen
contingency, very likely an ad hoc policy concerned primarily with the
alleviation of imminent or current problems.13 The long-term might be
loosely defined as denoting goals already established, towards
which an express policy is directed (likely to be in excess of ten
years). In the course of their responses, officials did not convey any
deep.ideological prerogative, and in fact they appeared to be motivated
by a very general concern for Canada's numerous internal problems. I
employ the term 'general' with regard to this particular question, for
it was obvious that at no time were these officials-precise as to 'how'
aid might in fact be employed as a short-term tool. The most explicit of
the three respondents observed:
"We select areas of interest for domestic reasons. We keep the
Caribbean because we don't wish to see American dominance in
that area..." 14.
Apparently then, the operational lhows' of the strategic perceptions, both
short and long-term, remain obscure. The tendency was to express them
Joan Nelson refers to them as 'bail-out' actions, as one-time measures
intended to achieve specific goals in the immediate future. J. Nelson,
Aid Influence and Foreign Policy, (AacMillan Co., New York, 1964)
In this regard, Clyde Sanger speculates that on the contrary, Canada
emphasizes aid to the Caribbean because of the very fact that the United
States would prefer to see Canada involved (for better or for worse)
rather than herself. Whether by tacit or formal acquiescence, I would
contend that this remains a safe assumption especially in light of the
fact that the Canadian economy is composed largely of U.S.-owned sub-
sidiaries and branch plants.
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in general terms only, in the broader context of policy rather than program
(an indication of 'how' Canadian policy employs aid as a short-run tool
will be examined shortly).
The third theme with which Canadian policy-makers identified, was
that of aid for the long-term development of the recipient society;an
objective classified as non-strategic in that "development" was viewed as
an end in itself, rather than in donor-beneficial terms. This theme was
designated on five occasions. In combining this theme with the long-term
strategic responses (total twelve times) it becomes apparent that despite the
lack of operational precision in the long-term strategic responses, Canadian
officials do not generally exhibit conscious perceptions of aid as a tool
of short-term policy. Needless to say, they do tend to regard 'strategic'
or donor-beneficial objectives as very important in aid deliberations.15
Yet what are the major components of these strategic motivations?
Do they constitute more than the very general and universal goals denoted
by "international stability" and "development"? Surely such catch-terns
ultimately comprise the desires of all 'progressive' policy-makers? Wouldn't
it perhaps be more appropriate to inquire as to what extent these general
objectives are compatible with 'development' through for example, the
application of state-controlled and highly centralized societies congruent
with Marxist or Socialist models of change? Moreover, wouldn't the
15. Although the donor-benefit objectives of 'peace' and 'stability' etc.
emerge as of greatest perceptual significance this does not exclude the
possibility thatthese conditions might also include within their make-up
elements conducive to theacquisition of Canadian commarcial and economic
benefits.
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attainment of "international stability" and "development" tend to be impeded
by perceptions dominated by 'East-West conflict' or ideological exigencies.
Or is it in fact due to 'East-West conflict' that such general objectives
are most important. One should recall that the circumstances which first
impelled Canada into joining the Colombo Plan were perceived in a highly
ideological and threat-conscious environment.16
Aid as Foreign Policy
Having earlier concluded that Canadian foreign aid is conceived
and formulated within a perceptual framework largely donor-beneficial in
nature (that is 'strategically' determined as opposed to humanitarianism),
one can then conclude that aid is a tool of Canadian foreign policy. When
asked: "Should aid be a function of Canadian oreign policy?", eleven officials
answered yes. As one put it: "It can't help but be;the two are synonomous".
Only one official answered to the contrary. Assuming then that aid is
perceived in a foreign-policy context, and that we can determine more precisely
what those foreign policy perceptions are, how do aid perceptions specifically
relate to the broader foreign policy dimension?
It is this paper's contention that if one begins with Canadian
foreign policy as a basis for analysis, Canadian foreign aid logically provides
a composite likeness of the basic principles of that foreign policy, though
obviously in a third world context. In other words Canadian aid policy,
which is not perceived as a means to explicitly exercising a particular type
16. This was the era of the Truman doctrine, George Kennan's 'containment'
policies, the 'witch hunts' of. Senator McCarthy and the phobias of
John Foster Dulles; an era in which the Western world in general was
'aroused' to the dangers of a communist colossus, and an era in which
Canadian forces helped counter the threat in Korea.
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of change on the recipient (political - social as well as economic), is
reflective of a relatively detached foreign policy itself relatively uncon-
cerned with explicitly bringing about a des'ired political or social change in
developing countries. Canadian aid policy, as Canadian foreign policy, is
not for example explicitly attempting to elevate Canada to the level of
'world leader' or spreading the Canadian concepts of 'freedom' and 'democracy'.
These are objectives more readily attributable to the 'United States or the
Soviet Union. Rather, as Professor Thomas Hockin contends, policy becomes
a kind of ".... rationalization of the Canadian experience" and is "....
unlike the American in that it is less messianic, less impatient, more
sensitive to national differences, amd more prone to the values of organization
maintenancen.17 Canadian policy then, is not evangelical in nature and
is less precise and purposive than the policies of the major super-powers.
Nevertheless, the values inherent in the transfer of Canadian aid do reflect
an economic system and a view of "development" which derive fundamentally
from a scientifically inspired insight into the process of change. Such
an insight does tend to value and stress concepts such as 'efficiency',
'organization', 'management control' as well as change brought about within
a neo-classical, Keynesian view of economic development.
17 Hertzman, L., Warnock, J. and Hockin, T. Alliances and Illusions: Canada
and the NATO-NORAD Question, (M.G. Hurtig, Edmonston, 1969).
18 For an excellent examination of the dominant cultural and ethical
components as they effect North American life generally see George Grant,
Technology and Empire (House of Anansi, Toronto, 1969), J.K. Galbraith,
Economics and the Public Purpose, (Houghton Mifflin Co. Ltd., Boston,
1973 and Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (Anchor Books, New
York, 1969) and Where the Wasteland Ends, (Anchor Books, New York, 1973).
All of course, discuss at length, the extent and implications of the
scientific world entitled The Myth of Objective Consciousness" view,
though Roszak's discussion provides perhaps the most lucid account of
it's pervasiveness.
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In responding to the following qdestion:"In terms of government
goals, what do you perceive to be the most important feature of Canadian
foreign policy? (See TABLE II), five general themes were designated as
most significant. The most frequently alluded to was that of "world stability"
and a "world community", so as to "... ensure that Canadians won't become
involved in armed conflicts". At no time did this theme reveal any overt
hint of policy as a purposive response to any perceived ideological or national
threats. Furthermore this theme is quite consistent with the responses to
the question "What is the greatest threat to Canada's security at this time?"
Ten respondents cited "Nuclear War", two cited "Loss of External Trade
Markets" and a single respondent "International Depression". Again the
absence of any ideological or national threat.
Secondly, Canadians referred to the objectives of national unity
and national sovereignty on three occasions. This appears to reflect a
concern for the possible secession of Quebec,ps well as a concern.with the
presence of American economic interests. Similarly,three respondents
identified 'universal economic and social development'. "Trade benefits"
and "West-bloc membership should contribute to economic interests" were
cited on one occasion only.
Significantly the response distribution to this particular question
parallels the responses to the question: "What do you feel are the primary
objectives of Canadian external aid?" (See Table I). This further
substantiates the existence of an almost synonymous perception of aid
with that of foreign policy. With the aid question the long-run strategic
goals were 'peace', 'stability' and the 'reduction of conflict', while
- 17 -
the short-term strategic goal was that of placating Quebec. Both of these
coincide with the two most frequently cited goals of Canadian foreign policy
that is ' Community Stability', 'Dispute Avoidance' and 'National Unity
and Sovereignty'.
TABLE II
IN TERMS OF GOVERNMENT GOALS, WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE
MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY?
The Relevance of East-West Conflict:
With the thought of establishing whether contemporary policy-makers
consider aid to be an important tool of East-West conflict, Cnadian
officials were asked: "To what extent do yoU think that the objectives of
aid are concerned with a reasonably successful prosecution of the Cold War?"
The responses emerged once again as virtually consistent with the afore-
mentioned view that foreign aid constitutes a tool of foreign policy and
is for the most part concerned with facilitating the evolution of a "world
community" and a state of "conflict avoidance". Had the responses to this
. . question been.oenerally ."yes aid is a Cold Mar tool" .i
Community - Stability, Dispute Avoidance 7
National Unity - National Sovereignty 3
Economic - Social Development 3
Trade Benefits J.
Western Bloc - Economic Interests 1
TOTAL 15
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that precise reference to a Communist or Soviet threat would have been
made in response to the question "What is the greatest threat to Canada's
security at this time?" (to be dealt with shortly). Moreover, if aid
had been viewed in a context of East-West conflict it is reasonable to
assume that the primary perceptions of foreign policy would not very likely
have been the concern for "stability" and universal "peace and development".
Yet,eight officials declared that aid was not considered a means to furthering
cold war objectives, with several adding that it was primarily such practices
by the United States which have served to intensify and create anti-American
feeling in the 'Third World'. As one official observed:
"I don't think that it has been. In fact, there are
some notable cases which indicate that we haven't been
doing this. In fact, in some instances we have been
doing just the reverse. For example, Canada is the only
Western bloc nation aiding the state of Kerala, a
Communist government, to which we have provided several
million dollars. In Vietnam, provinces known to be
completely controlled and dominated by Communists and
Viet Cong continue to receive Canadian aid".
In addition, of the five officials who did indicate a perception of aid as
a "Cold War" tool, three did so only to the extent that aid was successful
in 'winning friends', a far cry from the more conventional notions usually
associated with the East-West conflict (for example, 'confrontation' and
'nuclear balances').
Moreover, the perceptions ekpressed as a response to the question
dealing with "threats to national security" appear to parallel the 'stability'
and 'non-cold-war' themes previously designated. Ten responses stressed
concern for the likelihood of some form of nuclear war between the major
powers, although no specific state was identified as a possible direct
- 19 -
threat to Canadian security. In addition, officials designated on two
occasions the possible loss of external markets for trade, while depression
on an international scale constituted the final 'threat'.
Yet despite the responses dismissing East-West conflict as a major
aid factor, Canadian policy-makers did elicit an East-West conflict perception
in a non-aid context. For example, one of the more interesting series of
responses, were those dealing with the question of Canada's role in NATO.
The question asked:"What is your feeling on Canada's present and future
involvement in NATO?" Originally, it had been my intention to include
this question so as to establish if the manner in which aid is perceived
might vary according to an official expressing a 'hawkish' or
'dovish' response With regard to Canada's role in Europe. Considering that
at the time these interviews were administered (February 1969), this question
was one of the most controversial of the issues under scrutiny in Prime
Minister Trudeau's foreign policy review, one would have expected at least
some variation in the responses. Moreover, when we consider the consistency
of the responses pertaining to the 'stability' and 'non-cold-war' dimensions,
is it not conceivable to expect that the distribution of responses might
favour some form of revision or withdrawal from Europe. For surely, the
consolidation of such non-military objectives is limited by policies which.
initially serve to prolong and exacerbate East-West animosities. Remarkably
however, all the Canadian respondents felt that Canada should continue to
maintain her present commitment to Europe.19 This view was justified on two
19. Note however, that these interviews were administered prior to Prime
Minister Trudeau's disclosure that Canada's role in NATO warranted




grounds. Firstly, six officials asserted that "some sort of threat" con-
tinued to manifest itself and for that reason, the status quo should be
prolonged. The six remaining officials expressed a concern for the 'cost-
benefits' which Canada derives from continued membership and such close
relations with the United States. As two of the respondents observed:
"Frankly, I don't think we should have defence
forces at all. The United States is our umbrella ...
for us it becomes largely a technical question. Besides
spending on defence and aid is a bargaining point. The
fact that we cooperate with the United States, and that
we are spending in the interests of the American power
bloc, we get consideration in Washington. For example,
import and trade quotas, etc. It's like welfare to
Canadian economics".
the exchange argument that through association
we are provided with information that we on our own are
just unable to carry out, finance and research, is really
a plusten factor. It really is fantastic the technological
and scientific benefits we are able to derive just through
our association with the United States".
At first glance, these responses do not appear to be consistent with
those which earlier showed that Canadian aid is not considered an instrument
of the cold war, and that no single national or ideological force poses a
threat to Canada's security. Moreover, it presents a posture contrary to
more benign assumptions which one might generally attribute to officials
and Canadian policy generally. How then can one explain this apparent
inconsistency?
Accepting the reasonably wide variation in justifications (from a
'threae to 'cost-benefie motives) the responses might simply indicate that
the interviewed officials, because their foremost official concern is with
questions of aid, h4d not thought through the full implicatipns
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responses.to this particular question, and as a result were expressing what
was essentially an a priori reaction to a situation with which they were
largely unfamiliar. Even more likely, (especially with those who did perceive
a ithreatl), is a situation in which each official conceives of NATO as
existing within a framework remote from the context in which he views the
Third World. After all, Canadian aid concerns itself with the 'developing
areas' only, not Europe. Assuming this to be the case, is it not reasonable
to posit that the official -- necessarily compelled to focus his attention
on the Third World -- might not perceive a Soviet or Communist threat
(ideological) in this area? This would in part account for the absence of
the perception of aid as a tool in any East-West conflict, and for the
positive response concerning 'world stability' and 'dispute avoidance'
(again the question was asked and perceived in a Third World context). At
the same time this appears to be compatible with the perception of a national
or ideological threat in Europe, where aid is not a factor. The question
relating to the Cold War was asked with reference to aid, and would not
therefore be related with Europe. PresuMably, in a European framework,
East-West power rivalries still continue to comprise a very real component
of the perceptions of Canada's aid officials although few of them in the
course of operational planning are ever confronted with these two questions
and their potential inconsistenCy. The positive view therefore, supportive
of Canada's presence in NATO, appears understandable. So also do the
concepts of 'world stability' and 'dispute avoidance'. Moreover, if one
accepts the assumption that NATO is implicitly perceived as facilitating
the maintenance of a stable balance, and at the same time acting as an





Although the evidence presented to this point indicates that
Canadian aid is perceived in a 'national interest' or donor-benefit framework,
the explicit Ihows' of the question generally tend to remain obscure in
the minds of Canadian officials. The one clear indication of how aid is
'applied' at the operational level emerges if we examine the concentration
of aid allocations by country, and the policy-maker's perceptions of this
distribution. 'National unity' and 'national sovereignty' were designated
on three occasions as primary objectives of Canadian foreign policy and there-
fore 'national interest'.
Perceptions of a major shift in aid flows to Francophone Africa,
might indicate that aid is being employed to involve and satisfy that
section of the population which 'threatens to destroy any hope of lasting
unity'. Such a policy would serve to provide a response to the criticisms
expressed by many of Quebec's leaders and intellectuals, who especially
in the late sixties were highly critical and resentful of a foreign policy
which purported to reflect the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canada.
In response, therefore, to a question concerning the desirable future shifts
in area allocations, officials referred most frequently to Francophonie
(on four occasions), followed by Latin America (three times) and the
Caribbean (three times).
This received further support from references which were made during
conversations following the structured part of the interviews. In these
informal and more candid asides, officials readily discussed the reasons for
Chis new emphasis. As one of the two External Affairs officers remarked:
20. Equally one could attribute Canada's inability to decide on aid for
Liberation Groups in Africa as either typical of a non-Hobbesian
'neutral' approach to the situation, or as a means of preserving her
own economic and political interests in a very slowly changing situation
in southern Africa, or a combination of both..
21. A prevailing view among scholars who have dealt with Canadian foreign
policy is that historically, Canada has consciously attempted to remain
aloof from the 'Machiavellian intrigues' purportedly so much more
prevalent in the history of European relations. This has resulted
in the emergence of a Canadian 'voluntarist' tradition which today
connotes our ostensible search for moral opportunity in international
affairs. Witness our supposed, "unmilitary ethos". See Hertzman,
Warnock, and Hockin, op. cit., pp. 97-110 and James Eayrs, op. cit.
The Art of the Possible, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1961).
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"Political considerations depending on the situation
will play a part, of course, for example in the Francophonie.
There's no doubt about it, we are, in fact, attempting to
project domestic problems, to give Quebec and French
Canadians a sense of participation. Yet these areas still
require aid nonetheless, as much as the Commonweatlh countries".
This seems to acknowledge the view that in terms of Quebec, and the
disturbing effect her separation would no doubt have on Canadian national
unity, short-term strategic considerations, though not necessarily inspired
by evangelical or ideological notions, are a factor at the more precise,
allocative level of aid.20'
Nevertheless, we are still left without an answer to why officials,
when asked to identify Canada's aid objectives (admittedly within a general
context) failed to project even this particular issue to the level of aid
as a short-term strategic tool. It is almost as if a conscious concern
for such short-term 'political' factors was somehow unethical or Machiavellian,
something unbefitting Canada's past 'enlightened' and ostensible posture
as a 'neutral'. Yet needless to say the motivation quoted above is not
inappropriately classified as short-term strategic in nature. 21
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A partial explanation for this absence of preoccupation with the
short-terM strategic uses of Canadian aid is provided by Professor James
Eayrs, who contends that Canadian foreign _policy is subject to an inherent
partiality, historically mutured, which has tended to diminish the
importance accorded precise planning.22 In other words the Canadian
style tends to be responsive and without the more comprehensive planning,
implementation and purpose of the United States or the Soviet Union. Unlike
the United States for example, Canada has never established a specialized
foreign policy making body comparable to the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff. Furthermore, unlike the U.S., Canada does not possess
legislation comparable to Title IX of the United States Foreign Assistance
Act which makes specific provision for 'political development, .
23
Aid as a Tool of Political-Social Change:
The absence of an overt expression (both in policy and program)
to effect desired political and social changes on recipient societies is
evident in the responses to the questions on the 'objectives of Canadian foreign
aid' and 'foreign policy'. (See Table I and II). Though not questioned directly
on the concept of 'development', officials did nonetheless convey themes which
See James Eayrs, Ibid.
Title IX purports to address itself to encouraging ".... the growth
of democratic private and local governmental institutions in
carrying out its programs of assistance...." "Without broad
popular participation and without the institutions which make it
possible, the impact of aid will be sharply limited". William
S. Gaud, Primer on Title IX (The Foreward, AID Washington, 1968).
Even more purposive is the amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance
Act known as the Hickenlooper Amendment which seeks both to
protect existing American properties and in so doing ".... encourage
more private investment in underdeveloped areas", while at the same
time providing penalties if that investment and the obvious
principle inherent in it are not accepted.
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indicated to what extent they perceived 'development' as either 'economic'
or 'political-economic' (political is here employed synonymously with social).
Of the thirteen interviewed, seven associdted 'development' as synonymous
with economic development in a long-term sense. More than likely the
criteria for success inherent in such a perception would consist of
quantitative economic indicators dealing for the most part with the measurement
of output (for example GNP figures or favourable trade balances etc.)
At the same time, six respondents revealed a perception which conveyed an
awareness of both political and economic development. Presumably, the
indicators used for evaluation by these officials would tend to be neither
quantitative, nor exclusively economic. 'Development' would most likely
encompass more than the tangibles one generally associates with industrial
growth. For example, meeting expectations, a greater concern for income
distribution, and a more generalized meeting of basic needs. And yet none
of the interviewed officials even suggested 'how' aid might contribute to
'political-social development'.
24
This apparent lack of operational
sophistication, or what might merely be Canadian introspection was partially
confirmed by the fact that of the seven officials who perceived only
the economic component of 'development', five identified 'political' as
synomymous with what was previously defined as 'strategic', that is with
the primary intended result effecting Canada rather than the recipient
(for example 'universal peace' or placating Quebec dissidence).
24. With the exception of two officials (whose perceptions were economic-
political), all the Canadian officials interviewed were trained as
economists. This raises the question of whether the perceptual
framework of officials varies as a result of their academic training,
a situation quite possibly due to an emphasis on the recruitment of
economists. This would require extensive study of CIDA as well as an
inquiry into the differing perceptions of 'development' exhibited by
economists as distinct from political scientists or sociologists.
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Yet despite the absence of legislation and program policy con-
ceived within a more precise perceptual framework of international change
and development (as in the United States),-the evidence in this paper in
no way presents Canadian officials as devoid of strategic, donor-benefit
concerns. In fact one could interpret Canadian aid perceptions and
policy as a reflection of Canada's image of herself as a 'trading - nation'
whose principle objectives are economic (rather than political-social)
change in recipient countries conducive to the betterment of Canada's
economic and commercial status with the developing countries. Moreover
such a theory is quite compatible with the Trudeau cut-backs in the
Department of External Affairs, accompanied at the same time by a new
emphasis on greater Industry, Trade and Commerce participation in diplomacy
and foreign policy. For example Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that the
general bias against permitting Trade Commissioners to reach the rank
of Ambassador or High Commissioner, must be done away with and I.T.&C.
given greater attention. Again, the reasoning behind this revision stens
possibly from the view that Canada herself is not politically consequential,
that she is somehow above the Machiavellian dealings of U.S. - European
diplomacy, and therefore can and should with a clear conscience pursue her
more 'neutral, and 'sublime' economic role. The obvious danger however
is the extent to which the ultimate result of such an explicitly 'detached'
role can emerge as 'neutral' in its effects on the recipient. After all,
the economic and administrative values being transferred through Canadian
aid remain very much a product of the North American milieu, grounded in a
basically neo-classical, neo-Keynsian view of economic change and development.
25. See L. Hertzman, J. Warnock and T. Hockin, op.cit.
.26. See H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York, 1961) and
discussion in Hertzman, Warnock and ilockin, op.cit. pp. 123-125
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Conclusion: Neutral Or Partners in 'Development'
Having suggested that the economic and cultural milieu of Canada
and the United States exhibit relatively Similar qualities, the premise put
forward by John Holmes that a foreign policy of neutralism (like that of
Sweden's) would be theoretically inconceivable seems ever more plausible.
According to Holmes such a policy would be tantamount to a "verbal and
artificial construct divorced from public sentiment and support". For
Canadians are not 'neutral' people, and remain very much committed to
certain Western values. 25As on of the interviewed CIDA officials confessed:
"We are in the Western power bloc, we are there
whether we like it or not..., so we must carry out
policies not too opposed to the interests of that
group. Thus, the most dominant influence in foreign
policy becomes the influence of the most dominant
member of that group, in this case the United States".
To this extent then, the 'community' school of analysis, expressed
most clearly by Henry Kissinger,26 displays some insight. inc difficulty
for the Canadian policy-maker in perceiving the similarities between
Canada and the United States is created by the fact that these similarities
are internalized as part of the accepted value structure in North 'America.
In other words, the differences between the Canadian and American per-
ceptions of the development process and its impact would be considerably
less profound than the differences existing between the Canadian, French or
Chinese perceptions of the process. Yet Canadian policy-makers perceive
their differences in relation to the United States, rather than China or
France.
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This paper suggests that it is ali the conscious or operational
level of 'national interest' and 'implementation' where minor, though rarely
opposing differences in perception occur between Canada and the United
States. As one of the CIDA officials concluded:
"We have basically two minor ways in which to play
a positive role. We can play a military armed force
role and contribute to the defence of the group or we
can contribute to the economic interests of the group
and by this, influence it's cohesion. Canada isn't
interested in acquiring new lands or countries ....
consequently Canada must adopt the latter. We haven't
the strength and resources for the former as does the
United States."
Needless to say, the results of these two options need not be
opposed or anti-ethical. Henry Kissinger's assessment of a mere difference
in the degree of Canada's "pragmatic conviction" la the United States
would appear to remain undisputed.
In conclusion then this paper suggests that the perceptual framework
of Canadian aid officials is primarily donor-beneficial (strategic) in
nature, with an explicit general concern for 'international stability',
'peace' and a relatively homogenous world. The more precise motivations
consist of the potential for Canadian economic and commercial benefits.
Canadian officials, though verbally skeptical of short-run strategic motives,
are not above employing them, although admittedly (as in the case of Quebec
d 'national unity') they remain relatively non-offensive, non-ideological
and politically inconspicuous. The perceptual framework of Canadian
officials, insofar as it expressed a concern for the 'development' of the
recipient, did so in a relatively imprecise fashion, limiting itself
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largely to a non-political perception of change in the developing countries. 27
But for exceptional circumstances humanitarianism is not a significant
component of the Canadian perceptual framework. What remains to determine
is whether such perceptions are in fact reflected in Canadian aid policy
and programing.
27. In comparison to the U.S., U.S.S.R., China or France such a Canadian
perception stands to reason. The American position as an overseer
to tchange in a vast portion of the world is to a great extent
perceived as dependent upon how that change evolves, thus the
greater U.S. concern with producing desired re3ults In aid
recipient countries.
